OPENING PANDORA\u27S Box: ANALYZING THE COMPLEXITY OF U.S. PATENT LITIGATION by Ashtor, Jonathan H.
Yale Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 6
2017
OPENING PANDORA'S Box: ANALYZING
THE COMPLEXITY OF U.S. PATENT
LITIGATION
Jonathan H. Ashtor
Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP;
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan H. Ashtor, OPENING PANDORA'S Box: ANALYZING THE COMPLEXITY OF U.S. PATENT LITIGATION, 18 Yale J.L.
& Tech (2017).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/6
OPENING PANDORA'S Box: ANALYZING THE
COMPLEXITY OF U.S. PATENT LITIGATION
Jonathan H. Ashtor*
18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 217 (2016)
ABSTRACT
Patent litigation is widely regarded as one of the most
complex types of civil litigation, with costs often totaling
millions of dollars and typical cases lasting years. Also, the
burdens of patent case complexity land on both sides of the
technological divide, as large producers face skyrocketing
defense budgets and inventors and startups risk being 'riced
out" from enforcing their rights. Yet, the complexity of patent
cases is poorly understood as an empirical matter. Instead,
patent litigation is generally accepted to be a "Pandora's Box" of
incalculable complexity, which, once opened, is only arduously
and unpredictably concluded.
This study undertakes a comprehensive exploration of
patent litigation complexity, first defining robust metrics of
complexity and continuing with rigorous analysis of the
determinants thereof. We focus our study on the eight years of
U.S. District Court litigation leading up to passage of the
America Invents Act, and we mine extensive detail of more than
1000 cases during this timeframe. Using these data we ask
targeted questions about patent case complexity, including what
types of cases are most complex, how defense costs compare to
enforcement costs, what factors are associated with particularly
high complexity, and how complexity has changed over time.
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Finally, we conduct a large-scale event study to identify the
causal impact of key policy changes on case complexity,
specifically the landmark shifts in remedies law over a series of
recent Federal Circuit decisions.
The analysis herein is of crucial importance to patent
policy. As juridical property, patent rights are ultimately
enforced and defended against in legal proceedings, and thus
the complexity of such proceedings directly impacts the rights
afforded by patents and recourse thereunder. Understanding
case complexity is therefore a necessary contribution to patent
policy discourse. Moreover, the framework developed herein sets
the stage for future analysis of the complexity impact of new
policy measures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent litigation complexity is fundamental to patent
rights, implicating both the economic value and burdens
thereof. Economic theory explains that efficient outcomes are
likely in the absence of significant transaction costs-that is,
patents will be licensed at appropriate prices, bad patents will
be summarily invalidated, and injunctions of appropriate scope
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will issue, in situations where these outcomes are merited.
High litigation complexity impedes this process by skewing
incentives on both sides. Patent holders are motivated to seek
broader remedies for more speculative claims, knowing that
accused infringers would rather settle than pay higher costs in
litigation. In turn, accused infringers have incentives to "hold
up" patent holders who bring legitimate claims, knowing that
they can drive down the price of settlement or simply refuse to
take a license when the patent holder cannot afford to litigate a
case to judgment.
Litigation complexity also has fundamental normative
implications for patent rights. Patents are juridical property-
as such, the scope and strength of the rights they confer are
determined by, and dependent on, the legal environment in
which they are enforced. Furthermore, the inventions claimed
by patents are not otherwise "excludable," such that the only
recourse to prevent infringement is via judicial order.
Accordingly, it holds true for patents that justice delayed is
often justice denied, and therefore the causes and
characteristics of litigation complexity merit attention.
Nonetheless, with notable exceptions, patent litigation
complexity largely remains a black box in legal scholarship.
Data on litigation costs and attorneys' fees are not generally
available, and study by way of proxies therefore remains
limited. Accordingly, although "everyone knows" that patent
cases are highly complex and costly, nobody really know how
much so, or why.
In this study, we analyze over one thousand fully-
litigated patent cases in U.S. District Courts that were
concluded prior to passage of the America Invents Act (AIA).
For each case, we gather detailed information on the initial
claims, final dispositions, and the full litigation process in
between, examining the recorded dockets and constructing
metrics to measure the complexity of the proceedings. We
construct a dataset of over 150 unique variables for each case,
describing the asserted patents, characteristics of the litigants,
and procedural posture and outcome of the disputes. Using a
range of statistical techniques, we investigate case complexity
and the factors associated therewith, including specific
analyses of how complexity varies by type of disposition, phase
of litigation, party size and industry characteristics, and key
patent attributes.
Finally, we analyze the changes in patent litigation
complexity over time, finding a significant increase in the years
leading up to the AIA. However, this change is not uniformly
distributed across all patent cases, or all phases of litigation,
and we trace the principal sources of this increase to the
discovery and claim construction phase in cases where the
accused infringer prevails. Conversely, we also observe a sharp
2016 219
3
Ashtor: OPENING PANDORA'S Box: ANALYZING THE COMPLEXITY OF U.S. PATENT LI
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
220 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
increase in the complexity of trials in cases where the patent
holder wins. To investigate the underlying causes, we conduct
a statistical event study to determine whether the increased
complexity of patent trials results from recent changes in
remedies case law, particularly the standards for assessing
damages. We find strong evidence supporting this hypothesis,
and we discuss implications below.
The framework developed herein further sets the stage
for analyzing the impact that other patent policy measures
have had or are likely to have on litigation complexity. Most
notably, the AIA instituted several significant changes to the
patent litigation process, including post-grant patent review
and amendments to joinder and venue rules. The results of the
present analysis offer a baseline against which to evaluate the
impact of the AIA, and the empirical metrics and methodology
constructed herein are useful to study post-AIA patent cases,
once sufficient years of data become available.
This study is organized as follows. In Part II, we outline
relevant theoretical background and prior scholarship
concerning litigation dynamics generally and patent litigation
specifically. Next, Part III describes our dataset and empirical
methodology. Part IV provides the various analyses and
presents quantitative results. Interpretations and conclusions
follow in Part V.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Several different avenues of scholarship inform the
present study. From a theoretical perspective we draw on the
work of Priest and Klein, Eisenberg, and others in
understanding the dynamics between and incentives driving
parties in litigation. Empirically, Kesan and Ball's work
analyzing patent litigation pendency and disposition provides a
foundational framework for our methodology. Also, Lanjouw
and Schankerman's analysis of the likelihood of patent cases'
being litigated, as well as further work in this vein by Chien
and Kesan, Schwartz and Sichelman, respectively, explain the
selection effects that determine the composition of our dataset.
Finally, we also cite to survey studies by the AIPLA and other
work to inform our questions about enforcement costs and our
expected results.
A. Theoretical Framework
In The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, Priest and
Klein examine the relationship between fully litigated cases
Vol. 18
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and disputes that are settled before final adjudication.1 Based
on first principles that settlement is less expensive than
litigating and rational parties would seek to minimize their
risk and optimize their outcomes, they conclude that disputes
should only proceed to trial at the margins-where each party
estimates their chances of success to be approximately 50
percent (i.e., no discernible advantage between the parties).
Accordingly, they expect that the outcomes of these disputes
should be randomly distributed around a mean of 50 percent
success for each side, meaning plaintiffs and defendants should
each win approximately half the time when they litigate to
adjudication. They further test this hypothesis empirical with
litigation data from Cook County, Illinois, finding a 50 percent
success rate in most types of cases, and they explain the few
categories that depart from this expectation. 2  Their work
demonstrates that litigated cases are not a representative
sample of all disputes, and therefore conclusions drawn from
litigation may be inapplicable to the population as a whole
(more on this below).
Importantly, they also note one exception that is
expected to produce deviations from the 50 percent norm.
Where stakes are particularly high on one side (such as where
a dispute implicates other assets or businesses of a party), they
predict that one or both parties will be unwilling to settle and
even those with clear odds of success ex ante may proceed to
trial. 3 Notably, patent litigation is one of the principal areas
which does not conform to the Priest-Klein 50% hypothesis,
and many studies have reported patent holder success rates of
approximately 30 percent in fully litigated cases. 4
Notably, Eisenberg tested the 50 percent hypothesis and
found that it is not necessarily a general rule for all civil
litigation. 5 Best suited to tort litigation, the 50 percent rule is
actually a unique result derived from the selection of tort cases
for trial.6 However, in other types of cases, working from the
same principles of what incentives govern settlement behavior,
the sample of disputes expected to be litigated should yield a
different success rate. For example, Eisenberg observes a 38
percent success rate in medical malpractice cases in federal
I George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,5(1984).
2 Id. at 31.
3 Id.
4 See Rantanen, Jason, Why Priest-Klein Cannot Apply to Individual Issues in
Patent Cases (U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-15, 2013),
https://perma.cc/4V66-KT2T (discussing proponents and critics of the Priest-
Klein hypothesis, particularly as applied to patent cases).
5 Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical
Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 339 (1990).
6 Id. at 357.
2016
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court, which is consistent with his refined theorization of the
selection effects in this particular type of litigation. 7
It is crucial to note that Priest-Klein and subsequent
work were aimed at refuting literature that sought to rely on
litigated cases as a representative sample of all disputes. By
demonstrating the specific selection of which disputes are
likely to be litigated and which are likely to settle, they
demonstrated that litigated cases are not necessarily
representative of the population of disputes but are more
likely, in fact, to be outliers. This has central importance for
the present study, because we are focusing on fully litigated
cases and seeking to understand their behavior and draw
policy conclusions therefrom. Moreover, the vast majority of
patent cases settle before adjudication-at least on the order of
80 percent8-and therefore our dataset represents the "tip of
the iceberg" of all patent disputes.
Although we cannot infer that the complexity of cases
that are fully litigated has any bearing on the complexity of
disputes that settle prior to adjudication (or assertion), we
contend that the "tip of the iceberg" is likely to influence party
behavior across a range of patent disputes and transactions.
That is, the high costs and complexity of patent trials is a
strong factor in parties' decisions to avoid litigation and
negotiate settlement. Additionally, where the parties cannot or
refuse to reach agreement, adjudication is the only means
available to enforce a patent or for the accused infringer to
achieve freedom to operate. Thus, litigated cases are precisely
those cases that matter most to giving effect to the rights
secured by patents-the right of the patent holder to exclusive
practice without infringement and the freedom of everyone else
to practice around the limits of patent claims without
restriction.
B. Empirical Scholarship-Litigation Process and
Outcomes
In How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent
Disputes,9 Kesan and Ball undertake an unprecedented large-
scale empirical study of patent lawsuits to examine rates of
settlement, pendency until adjudication or settlement, and case
outcomes and specific holdings. By examining docket records
7 Id.
8 See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent
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of each case filed across three annual cohorts, they identify and
precisely catalogue the disposition of each case and provide a
detailed view of patent adjudication in the District Court
system. In particular, they determine the actual rates of
settlement of patent cases to be approximately 80 percent,
rather than the commonly assumed rate of 95 percent. 10 Also,
they identify summary judgment as a principal mechanism for
adjudicating patent cases on their merits, and they further find
that although summary judgments occur earlier in proceedings
than trial, they are not likely to be substantially less costly,
based on their measures of litigation expenditure.1
Importantly, Kesan and Ball pioneer a new metric for
studying litigation expenditures, focusing on the number of
documents filed by all the parties in each case, rather than the
time elapsed from complaint to disposition. They explain that
case duration is a poor proxy of litigation costs as it "is
notoriously inaccurate due to the idiosyncrasies of court
schedules and the like,"12 whereas docket entries are likely to
be "more closely correlated with actual litigation costs." 1 3 We
follow their approach, and we further build upon it to analyze
relative party expenditures in a given litigation.
Another notable study has employed surveys to
estimate average litigation costs in dollar values. The most
widely cited figures derive from survey studies by the
American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA),
which estimate that legal costs can range from $500,000 to $3
million per suit, or $500,000 per claim at issue, for each party
involved in the litigation.1 4 However, specific case-by-case data
on fees and litigation costs is not generally available, and
average values do not provide meaningful guidance because
actual costs are highly skewed and vary widely between
cases.
15
Moreover, even if actual fee data were available in every
case, it would be unlikely to accurately represent the full costs
of the litigation. Attorneys' fees do not account for the internal
10 See id. at 264.
11 See id. at 246.
12 Id. at 258.
13 Id. at 311.
14 See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2015).
15 Work concerning the recent fee-shifting debates has used court awards of the
losing party's fees in those cases where fee-shifting applied. See, e.g., James
Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 59, 80-82 (2012); see also Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What Patent
Attorney Fee Awards Really Look Like, 63 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 15 (2014)
(analyzing fee shifting decisions in view of debates over reforms to the
standards for fee-shifting in patent cases). However, these datasets do not
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resources, time, and effort devoted by each party to the case,
particularly in handling discovery, analyzing technical issues,
strategizing, and, in some instances, designing around
infringement. Accordingly, although proxies for litigation
expenditures do not provide precise dollar values of actual
costs, they are the best measure available. We proceed by
using various proxies for overall litigation complexity, in the
attempt to provide a representative and unbiased assessment
of the total expenditure that patent cases entail.
C. Empirical Scholarship-Likelihood of Litigation
Also relevant to our present focus is research on the
factors that give rise to patent case filings in the first instance.
The work of Lanjouw and Schankerman is formative in this
area, particularly their studies that examine the predictors of
patent infringement suits in a broader economic context. 1 For
example, they examine market and industry factors, litigant
characteristics, patent densities and technology fields, and they
investigate correlations of these factors with case filings.
These studies identify certain characteristics of parties and
patents that increase the likelihood of a suit being filed in a
particular market/industry and competitive dynamic. For
example, they find that the probability of patent litigation
increases with respect to patents that are central to follow-on
innovations of a company, particularly between companies that
are close rivals or where the patent holder needs to maintain a
reputation for aggressive enforcement. 17  By contrast,
companies in concentrated industries or with particularly large
patent portfolios relative to others are less likely to engage in
litigation as they often can engage in cross-licensing or have
other means of avoiding disputes. 18
III. DATASET AND METHODOLOGY
We begin our analysis of patent litigation complexity by
constructing a comprehensive dataset of cases decided in U.S.
District Courts during the eight years preceding enactment of
16 Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research
Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. J.
441 (2004); Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual
Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45 (2004);
Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation:
A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001).
17 Lanjouw and Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation, supra note
15, at 129-30.
18 Lanjouw and Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 15, at 48.
Vol. 18
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the America Invents Act ("AIA"). Our dataset includes over
1000 cases decided between 2004 and 2011, and we undertake
extensive individual research of the litigation proceedings.
Specifically, with the assistance of a team of
researchers, we parse the full dockets of each case and identify
each motion of the patent holder and accused infringer and
every substantive court order during the litigation. We further
read the complaints and final dispositive orders and catalogue
the types of claims asserted in each case, final outcome and
specific holdings regarding each of the patents at issue, and we
flag the presence of certain key events, such as Markman
hearings (which construe the claims of the patents at issue),
injunctions and appeals. 19
Finally, we incorporate detailed contextual, party and
patent information, which facilitates the multivariate
statistical analysis below. We conduct background research on
the litigants to identify their primary industries and size,
whether they are publicly traded or privately held, and
whether the patent holder in each case is a practicing entity or
non-practicing entity (NPE). Finally, we identify each patent
asserted and code an extensive array of attributes using
commercial patent databases. Appendix A provides additional
description of our dataset composition and Appendix B
describes our variables, as resources for other researchers.
A. Construction of Complexity Metrics
We construct four quantitative metrics to evaluate and
analyze patent litigation complexity, as follows. Each metric
represents increasing complexity, such that a higher metric
value represents a more complex case according to that metric.
Case Duration: For each case we analyze the
dockets and read the initial complaints and final
dispositive orders by the district court to identify the
dates when the case was initiated and concluded at
the district-court level, respectively. 20  We also
record the date of the final opinion, order or trial at
the district-court level; for example, in cases
resolved by summary judgment we code the date of
19 This work entailed a tremendous research effort by many people, including
(in alphabetical order) Daniella Carelh, Courtney Daukas, Josh Glazer, Grace
Haidar, Erika Szmanski and Devin Wright, among others. The author is
very grateful for their time, effort and perseverence. Special thanks also for
the thoughtful insights and contributions of Amber Will.
20 Where there were multiple amended complaints we used the original
complaint, even in cases where this was originally filed several years prior to
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the court's summary judgment ruling, whereas in
cases involving trials we record the date when the
jury delivered the verdict (if no subsequent court
order was issued) or otherwise when the court issued
the final order based on the verdict.
* Total Docket Entries and Docket Entries to
Disposition: We also code the total number of docket
entries involved in the district-court proceedings,
with the aim of filtering out noise from various
circumstances that can prolong or shorten the
duration of individual cases. This approach was
pioneered by Kesan and Ball,21 and we further
extend their methodology by counting both the total
number of entries in the district-court docket as well
as the entry index number corresponding to the final
disposition. This allows us to distinguish and
analyze the post-judgment phase of litigation, which
may include notices of appeal, motions for fee-
shifting, remittitur or vacatur of damages awards
and other continuing proceedings.
* Party Motions and Court Orders:22  Finally, to
enable analysis of the relative effort and expenditure
of patent holders relative to accused infringers, we
read each docket and hand-count the number of
substantive party motions and court orders between
the initial complaint and final disposition. 23 To
reduce noise, we count only the initial motion filed
by a party, excluding additional related filings-for
example, where adjacent entries were labeled as a
brief or certificate of service, we counted only the
motion itself. We also identify the name of the party
filing each motion and code whether it is one of the
patent holders or accused infringers in the case.
Finally, we identify each instance of the word "order"
appearing in the docket and read the title of the
resulting entry to determine if it is a substantive
court order. We excluded docket entries such as
"transcripts" or "minutes" of proceedings,
"scheduling orders," etc. As with party motions,
where entries adjacent to a court order were related
to it, such as memoranda and opinions regarding a
21 Kesan and Ball, supra note 7.
22 These metrics were constructed for cases from 2004-2009.
23 We counted the original complaint and answer as a "motion" and otherwise
searched for the word "motion" in the docket file and read the title of the
entry to ensure it was appropriately classified as a motion (rather than, for
example, a "brief in support of motion").
Vol. 18
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short-form order, we counted the group only once to
avoid redundant entries.
Notably, responsive filings of a party to a given
motion are excluded from our counts, as this would
eliminate the specificity regarding which party
initiated the motion in question. Thus, one would
expect the number of court orders to roughly equal
the sum of each party's individual motions, on
average, given that typically the court will need to
issue a ruling on each substantive motion filed by
either party. This result is illustrated in the charts
presented below.
B. Distributions of Case Complexity
Here we report principal statistics regarding each of our
complexity metrics, namely case duration (complaint to
disposition by the District Court), docket entries to disposition
and substantive docket entries (party motions and court
orders). Table 1 below reports the mean, median, and standard
deviation of each of our complexity metrics.
Case Duration 1003 822 714
(days):
Docket Entries 283 205 284
to Disposition:
Subst. Docket 72 53 75
Entries:
Table 1: Statistics of Overall Complexity Metrics
Based on this data, the average duration of patent cases
is over 2.7 years from complaint to disposition via trial or
summary judgment (see first row above). Duration also varies
substantially across cases, with a standard deviation on the
order of 2 years (see above). The litigation process entails
considerable activity as recorded in the dockets, with close to
300 entries on average, approximately 70 of which are full
substantive motions and court orders (third row in table
above). Both of these measures also vary widely, with standard
deviations approximately equal to the respective means.
Notably, there is a substantial difference between
overall docket entries and substantive docket entries, reflecting
the fact that single substantive events in a litigation often give
rise to multiple docket entries. For example, a motion for
summary judgment could involve a large number of briefs,
supporting affidavits and exhibits, supplements and
2016 227
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amendments, etc. Although each of these entries requires
some expenditure of substantial cost and effort on the part of
the litigants and/or the court, the actual amount thereof is
likely to vary considerably. For example, significantly more
costs and effort are associated with a motion for summary
judgment than a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence,
although even the latter requires attorney time and incurs
related expenses. Filtering for substantive motions and orders
thus allows us to focus on relevant litigation events that
contribute to overall complexity, excluding non-substantive,
interrelated ,and duplicative docket entries.
We illustrate the distributions of each metric in Figure
1 (Histogram of Case Duration), Figure 2 (Histogram of Docket
Entries to Disposition), and Figure 3 (Histogram of Substantive
Docket Entries). These figures illustrate the Poisson
characteristics of the distributions, which are expected given
the positive whole integer nature of the duration or docket
counts in question. 24
24 We log-transformed each metric to approximate a normal distribution for
linear regression analysis, and we employed statistical tests to ensure that
transformed metrics were suitably normal for standard modeling and
significance testing. Specifically, we performed Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S)
tests to compare the log-transformed distribution against a randomly-
generated normal distribution having the same mean and standard
deviation. We generated ten-fold repeated random normal samples having
the same mean and standard deviation as the log-transformed distribution,
and we averaged the K-S test results over these 10 iterations. As shown
below, the results confirm that the log-transformed metrics are normally
distributed (p-values are large, supporting the null hypothesis of identity):
Ln. Case Duration Ln. Tot. Ln. Entries to Ln. Subst.
Entries Disposition Entries
d-Val: 0.0537 0.0557 0.0425 0.0615
p-Val: 0.1447 0.1835 0.3943 0.2584
Vol. 18
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Figure 1: Histogram of Case Duration
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Substantive Docket Events to Disposition
Figure 3: Histogram of Substantive Docket Events
C. Analysis of Complexity Metrics
First, we analyze overall case complexity based on
outcome and disposition to determine whether patent holder
wins are more or less complex than accused infringer wins.
Next, we focus on the relative efforts of each party and further
parse these results based on specific disposition on the asserted
patent (i.e., infringed, invalid, unenforceable or non-infringed).
1. Case Complexity by Outcome and Disposition
Figures 4 and 5 below show the breakdown of our
metrics by case outcome. Figure 4 shows the total case
duration, total number of docket entries, and number of
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Figure 4: Case Complexity by Outcome (Overall Complexity)
One initial observation from Figure 4 above is that each
of the complexity metrics based on docket entries is
substantially greater for patent holder wins than in cases
which the accused infringer prevailed.2 5 Significance testing
reveals that each of these differences is statistically significant
at the 5% level. 26 This makes sense, given that patent holder
wins involve an additional remedies phase, whereas damages
and injunctions are typically not assessed in patent cases until
infringement has been established. Determination of damages
is often particularly complex and contentious, often requiring
additional briefing, expert witnesses, specific findings of fact,
and court rulings.
Turning from outcome to case disposition, we measure
the complexity of cases finding infringement (patent holder
wins) relative to invalidity, unenforceability and non-
25 Notably, the fact that case duration does not follow suit suggests that, in line
with our theory, duration is not a reliable metric of true complexity.
26 The results of t-tests applied to log-transformed data of each metric are as
follows:
Metri Means p-val1e
Case Duration PH wins: 977d 0.79
Al wins: 1016d
Total Docket Entries PH wins: 416mo 3.18e-9 *
Al wins: 297mo
Docket Entries to Disp. PH wins: 338mo 1.73e-7 *
Al wins: 255mo
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infringement. Figure 5 illustrates this data. Whereas patent
holder wins are generally more complex than each category of
accused infringer wins, we observe that cases finding
unenforceability tend to have higher numbers of docket entries
and motions/orders. However, given that unenforceability is
found for fewer than 10% of patents, 27 the increased average
complexity likely reflects the particular features of these






M Mean Tot. Entries
U Mean AT Mo
* Mean Entries to Disp.
Mean Subst. Mo & Ord
Mean PH Mo
Figure 5: Case Complexity by Disposition (Each Metric)
2. Patent Holder vs. Accused Infringer Motions
Next we measure relative party effort in terms of the
number of substantive motions filed by patent holders
compared with accused infringers. Figure 6 shows a scatter
plot mapping accused infringer motions against patent holder
motions in each case. As this graph shows, the parties'
respective motions appear to be strongly correlated with each
other, with the number of accused infringer motions increasing
with the number of patent holder motions (and vice versa).
Figure 6 shows an overlay of the y=x line representing equal
numbers of motions by each party. The data generally lies
27 See Appendix A, infra.
28 We omit case duration from the results presented below, but we confirmed
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slightly above this line and appears to follow the same slope-
this corroborates the observed correlation. However, the fact
that most cases appear to lie above the y=x line also suggests
that the number of accused infringer motions may be slightly










Holder Motions vs. Accused
Figure 7 further illustrates this relationship, splitting
patent holder wins from patent holder losses. In each
grouping, accused infringers file more motions on average than
patent holders. Yet the differences between the averages is
relatively small, with approximately two additional motions
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Figure 7: Patent Holder Motions vs. Accused Infringer
Motions by Outcome
Significance testing reveals that the difference in each
set of cases is significant only at the 10% level. Furthermore,
significance is lost if a single motion is removed from the
accused infringer cases in the aggregate. We expect that this
corresponds to an additional motion for summary judgment
filed by accused infringers. That is, given that the
infringement analysis required for the patent holder to prevail
is highly fact intensive, it typically requires adjudication at
trial. In contrast, patent validity may be restricted to
questions of law and may therefore succeed at summary
judgment. Accordingly, the data suggests that accused
infringers are likely availing themselves of summary judgment
to try to invalidate the patents asserted against them.2 9
This analysis also reveals that the determination of
which party prevails in a case is not principally governed by
which party filed more motions. We see that, as discussed
supra, both patent holder wins and accused infringer wins
involve relative parity in the average number of motions filed
by each party. This is an encouraging result, as it suggests
that the merits of the case, rather than simply the number of
motions filed by the prevailing party, drive case outcome. By
contrast, if we observed that the prevailing party is
predominantly the party filing the most motions, that would
suggest that litigation effort is the principal determinant of
outcome, irrespective of the facts at hand. Rather, our
observation that average party effort is equivalent between
cases in which patent holders win and those in which accused
29 Accord Kesan and Ball, supra note 5, at 264.
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infringers prevail preserves the possibility that substantive
merits of the case are important to the eventual decision.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Complexity by Phase of Litigation
In this Section, we analyze the breakdown of case
complexity according to the principal phases of patent
litigation. We define these phases as follows: Phase I,
complaint to claim construction (Markman hearing); Phase II,
claim construction to disposition (summary judgment or trial);
and Phase III, post-disposition proceedings (e.g., post-trial
motions and orders). According to this convention, Phase I
accounts for discovery and claim construction, as well as
general case administration. Phase II comprises pre-trial
scheduling and conferences (where applicable), briefing on
motions for summary judgment (where applicable),
interlocutory appeals from the Markman hearing, and
preparation for the trial or summary judgment proceedings.
Phase III includes motions for costs and fee-shifting as wells as
motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL), new trial
and remittitur, etc. 30
In Table 2, we report summary statistics of the number
of docket entries in each phase of litigation. Phase II,
Markman-to-disposition, involves the greatest number docket
events, but Phase I, discovery and pre-Markman proceedings,
are nearly as complex:
Phase Q1 Med. Mean Q3
Pre-Markman (I) 69 104 155 183
Disposition (II) 65 149 195 249
Post-Disposition 12 28 65 77
(III)
Table 2 - Docket Counts of Litigation Phases
30 We identify each phase by first selecting all cases from our dataset which
involve a separate Markman hearing (which, as shown in the regression
results in Part C infra, are among the most complex cases). We then code the
specific position of the Markman hearing in the case docket as a percentage
of the total docket entries from the original complaint until disposition
(summary judgment or trial). Finally, in order to capture the post-disposition
phase, we calculate the difference in docket entries from the disposition to
case closure phase. See Stuart J.H. Graham & Nicolas Van Zeebroeck,
Comparing Patent Litigation Across Europe: A First Look, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 655, 663 (2014) (describing the patent litigation process generally)).
Many thanks to the author for sharing this resource.
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Next, we investigate the relative complexity of Phases I
and II in patent holder wins vs. losses. Figure 8 below shows
this analysis by mapping the position of the Markman hearing
as a percentage of the number of docket entries between the
complaint and disposition phases. We have ordered the cases
according to increasing Phase I complexity and have
differentiated patent holder wins (red squares) from losses
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Figure 8: Phase I-II Complexity (PH Wins vs. Losses)
The difference in the average Markman position
between patent holder wins and losses is statistically
significant,31 indicating that the Markman hearing occurs
proportionately earlier in patent holder wins than in losses.
This corroborates the findings above regarding the increased
complexity of patent holder wins corresponding to the remedies
phase at trial--this results in a relatively longer Phase II and
earlier Markman position in the docket as a whole.
Next, we analyze the relative complexity of Phase III,
again distinguishing patent holder wins from losses. Figure 9
illustrates the data. Patent holder wins exhibit increased
complexity in post-trial proceedings, 32 which again may relate
to ongoing litigation over remedies (e.g., post-trial motions to
vacate or remit a jury award of damages). This also likely
reflects the fact that patent holder wins generally require a
trial, which can involve extensive post-trial proceedings; patent
31 p-Value of 1.90e-6.
32 The difference is significant at the 1%o level (p-value of 0.006).
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holder losses, by contrast, may be adjudicated at summary
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Figure 9: Phase II-III Complexity (PH Wins vs. Losses)
Finally, we analyze all three phases together to
illustrate the relative complexity of each one. Figure 10 below
shows the resulting graphs. We distinguish patent holder wins
from losses by separating the cases into two sets of figures, and
in each set we successively order the cases by increasing
complexity in each of the three phases (for a total of six
graphs). The vertical dashed line in these figures indicates the
median case according to each ordering, and the final row
provides box-plot comparisons of the data in each set.33
By comparing the median positions in patent holder
wins relative to losses, we see that Phase I (discovery and
Markman) in wins is less complex than in losses, whereas
Phases II (trial or summary judgment) and III (post-
disposition) are each more complex in wins than losses. This
demonstrates again that the differential complexity of patent
holder wins tends to reside in the trial and post-trial phases,
whereas patent holder losses tend to concentrate in relatively
more complexity in Phase I and are resolved more summarily
thereafter.
33 For example, the line in the top-right figure represents the patent holder win
having the median Phase III complexity.
21
Ashtor: OPENING PANDORA'S Box: ANALYZING THE COMPLEXITY OF U.S. PATENT LI
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
238 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Increasing Phase I Complexity
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I I I I I
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Complexity by Phase (PH Wins v. Losse
Increasing Phase III Complexity
I I I I I I I I
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
s)
B. Regression Analysis
Next, we conduct regression analyses to determine
whether patent litigation complexity can be modeled
statistically and, if so, which factors are principally correlated
with overall case complexity.
1. Regression Models
We construct linear regression models starting with a
baseline set of standard variables and iteratively add new
factors and test whether they increase the explanatory power
of the resulting model. Table 3 below shows the overall fit
parameters of the final models for each metric:
Vol. 18
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Dependent Variable R2 Adj. R2 Std. Error F Statistic p-value
(df) (dfl, df2)
(1) Docket Entries to 0.460 0.427 0.697 14.09 < 2.2e-16
Disposition (911) (55, 911)
(2) Total Docket 0.477 0.445 0.674 15.09 < 2.2e-16
Entries (911) (55, 911)
(3) Subst. Docket 0.455 0.403 0.686 8.74 < 2.2e-16
Entries to Disposition (576) (55, 576)
(4) Duration to 0.196 0.149 0.616 4.09 < 2.2e-16
Disposition (921) (55, 921)
Table 3 - Regression Models of the Complexity Metrics
Appendices C through F provide the full regression
results of certain relevant variables corresponding to the
models above. One immediate observation is that each docket-
based metric has considerably better fit than time duration. 34
This is consistent with the theory that duration is a noisy
metric for litigation, and particularly for patent cases that may
be subject to stays and other breaks in continuity.35
Each of the docket-based metrics exhibits a reasonably
good fit, which suggests that our models are robust and largely
complete. 3 However, litigation dockets exhibit a high degree of
idiosyncratic variation case-to-case, which limits the best
degree of fit achievable by any statistical model. 37
34 Specifically, although all of the p-values are statistically significant at
standard levels, the duration p-value is larger (less significant) and the
corresponding F statistic is three to four times lower than those of the docket
metric models. The values for multiple R2 and adjusted R 2 are also
substantially greater for each of the docket metrics.
35 See Kesan and Ball, supra note 5, at 281 ("Time to termination is a
traditional measure of the resources expended on a court case. However,
while it has a strong intuitive appeal, this measure is also likely to be
inaccurate. There can be long delays in scheduling court hearings and periods
of inactivity that are not necessarily associated with higher costs. The
number of documents filed in the case is probably more closely correlated
with actual costs, particularly in the form of 'billable hours' of attorney
time.").
36 In particular, each has a relatively high F statistic (F values increase from 1)
and correspondingly near-zero p-value. The residual errors of each model
appear to be normally distributed and do not exhibit clear, non-random
trends, as shown in the graphs in Appendices C-E, which suggests that there
are no strong determinative factors missing from the models. Finally, the
multiple and adjusted R 2 values of each model, typical measures for the
degree of fit, are reasonably high.
31 Other features of the models also suggest that we are capturing the bulk of
the non-idiosyncratic factors that affect complexity in each case and are not
missing key variables. For example, a consistent set of factors are significant
across the models for all metrics; furthermore, the results of each model are
generally tolerant to minor changes in the selection of variables.
Additionally, the errors of each model are generally normally distributed.
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2. Significant Factors Associated with Case
Complexity
Next, we analyze how certain key factors relate to case
complexity. We focus here only on the total docket count
models, given their greater degree of fit than the models of case
duration and substantive docket entries.
(a) Case Procedure and Disposition Variables:
The case procedure variables generally behave
consistently with expectations. For example, cases that were
stayed and then resumed, such as stays for parallel USPTO or
ITC proceedings involving the asserted patents, tend to involve
more docket filings than uninterrupted cases. This likely
reflects the heightened contentiousness of the dispute-the
parties are litigating across multiple forums-as well as the
possibility of changed circumstances when the case resumes
and must be briefed and analyzed anew.
Also, cases that involve separate Markman hearings for
claim construction involve more docket activity, which reflects
additional litigation effort for such proceedings. In turn, cases
involving motions for interlocutory appeal by either party
following a Markman hearing also reflect greater complexity.
Trials are statistically significant, and we also observe
greater complexity of cases involving jury trials relative to
bench trials. This makes sense-jury trials require voir dire
proceedings, and may also involve disputes over jury
instructions and other trial procedures. Also, it is commonly
understood that bench trials are typically not opted for in the
most high-stakes patent disputes, and therefore the presence of
jury trials likely coincides with other factors contributing to
case complexity.
Finally, we also observe some evidence of Circuit
variations, with U.S. District Courts located in the Third
Circuit and Ninth Circuit exhibiting greater complexity in their
cases on average. The significance of the Ninth Circuit likely
reflects a greater proportion of high-tech and software patent
cases in the Northern and Central Districts of California near
Silicon Valley, whose cases involve complex issues of validity
and changing standards governing the patentability of
computer software. These cases may also exhibit greater
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The most interesting set of results involve the types and
characteristics of parties who are involved in cases exhibiting
the highest complexity. For example, the size of the accused
infringer registers as strongly and positively associated with
increased case complexity. This may indicate that large
corporate defendants tend to fight harder, and the process of
enforcing patents against such entities may be more difficult.
Also, litigation involving large defendants likely entails greater
evidentiary complexity, including more document production,
corresponding motions in limine, and court rulings on
exclusion, privilege, and other issues.
Similarly, the size of the patent holder is significant and
positively associated with increased complexity. 38 This could
indicate that large corporate patent holders prosecute their
claims more aggressively, but it also likely reflects similar size
with respect to discovery, determination of damages and
adjudication of other issues.
One result that reflects recent policy focus is the
increase in case complexity associated with the number of
accused infringers. This likely reflects practices during the
height of the patent litigation boom, whereby patent holders
could sue an entire industry with a single complaint. The
joinder rules of the AIA were designed to prevent such
practices by requiring a greater nexus between independent
defendants in order to join them in the same case.39 Yet, these
rules have also been criticized for increasing the overall
number of lawsuits and potentially inhibiting aggregated
disposition of common issues, which arguably may increase the
overall burdens on the litigation system. 40 In any event, we
observe that cases involving multiple accused infringers exhibit
greater complexity, and post-AIA we expect that the propensity
of such cases has been reduced.
Also important from a policy perspective is the
complexity of litigation involving Non-Practicing Entities
(NPEs). We separated NPEs who are individuals, universities,
and companies (including Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs)).
Our results reveal that cases involving NPE-individuals have
significantly lower complexity on average. This may reflect the
lesser resources available to individual inventors and the
difficulties they face in protecting their rights against
infringers. By contrast, we observe no significant difference in
38 Additional research is being conducted to investigate whether these results
can be further parsed by pairwise groupings of the parties, such as cases
involving large companies on both sides.
39 35 U.S.C. 299 (2012).
40 See, e.g., Dongbiao Shen, Misjoinder or Mishap? The Consequences of the AIA
Joinder Provision, 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. (2014).
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the complexity of PAE litigation relative to other cases, based
on these metrics.
(c) Patent Attributes:
Several interesting patent attributes relate to case
complexity. For example, although the individual technology
classifications of the asserted patents are not highly
significant, we do observe that high-tech cases specifically are
more complex than the average. 41
Interestingly, forward citations, which are typically
associated with patent value or importance, exhibit no
significance. Forward citations of a patent are the aggregate
number of future patents that cite to the original patent in
their lists of "references cited"; several databases keep track of
forward citations, including the USPTO's "Referenced By"
feature, 42 and they are often used in statistical analyses as
proxies for patent value, among other things. This is striking
because one might expect cases involving higher value patents
to be more contentious. However, it is possible that two effects
are counteracting each other in the overall data-certain high
value patents are less complex to litigate, as they are clearer
and less susceptible to lengthy disputes over claim
construction, whereas high value patents may generally
involve increased case complexity due to higher stakes.
Patent family size is also strongly positively
significant-this likely corresponds to higher-stakes litigation
involving more developed technologies that have been
improved and refined by the patent holder. Notably, to some
extent, this may correlate with entity size as well, reflecting
patent holders with larger R&D budgets.
Finally, one particular patent variable that we would
expect to correspond to increased complexity is the number of
patents involved in the case. When multiple patents are
asserted, regardless of outcome, we would expect greater
complexity than cases involving a single patent. Although our
flag for multiple patents does not register as significant in the
overall regressions, this may be the result of interactions with
other variables-in particular we suspect that cases brought by
and against large companies are likely to involve multiple
patents, making it difficult to parse out the individual
significance of each factor.
We test this hypothesis by creating interaction terms to
identify cases where a large patent holder or accused infringer
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was involved and whether single or multiple patents were
asserted.43 As shown below in Table 4, cases involving multiple
patents are significantly more complex than cases involving a
single patent:
Regressor Coeff. Std.Err. t-val Pr(> It I) Signif.
Multi-Patents x Large-Entity PH 0.24 0.08 2.99 0.002 **
Single-Patent x Large-Entity PH 0.03 0.08 0.40 0.68
Multi-Patents x Large-Entity Al 0.14 0.07 1.92 0.06












Table 4 -Regressions of Multi-Patent Interactions
43 Results are consistent for both docket entry metrics; in the table below we
report results using the total docket count dependent variable.
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Time Trend Analysis and Event Study
3. Time Trend Analysis
Next, we investigate whether case complexity has
significantly increased or decreased over time, across the years,
in our sample. Table 5 below shows the results of a simple
linear regression using our metrics as the dependent variable
and the year of decision as the independent variable. We find a
significant increasing time trend year-to-year in the number of
docket entries (both total and number to disposition). Also,
with respect to substantive docket entries, although we detect
no significant time trend overall (2004-2009), we do find a
slightly significant trend in the most recent years (2007-2009).
By contrast, case duration does not exhibit a




Metric R2 Adj. R2 Std. Error F Statistic p-value
(df) (dfl, df2)
Case Duration 5.36e-6 -1.01e-3 0.666 5.26e-3 0.942
(981) (1, 981)
Tot. Docket 0.0111 0.0101 0.915 10.88 1.01e-3 **
Entries (971) (1, 971)
Docket Entries 0.00871 0.00768 0.900 8.56 3.58e-3 **
to Disposition (971) (1, 971)
Subst. Docket 7.31e-5 -1.51e-3 0.888 0.0461 0.830
Entries (631) (1, 631)
Subst. Docket 7.43e-3 4.94e-3 0.876 2.986 0.0847.
Entries ('07-'09) (399) (1, 399)
Table 5: Time Trend Regressions of Complexity Metrics
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Docket Entries and Case Duration by
The fact that we observe significant increasing time
trends, particularly in recent years, is somewhat concerning.
To some extent, this appears to reflect common concerns about
the increasing burdens of patent litigation on defendants. We
find corroboration by separating patent holder wins from
losses, whereby only patent holder losses exhibit a significant
time trend. Figure 13 and Table 6 show this result:
Vol. 18
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Figure 13: Time Trends by Prevailing Party
Metric R2 Adj. R2 Std. Error F Statistic p-value
(df) (dfl, df2)
Entries to Disp. 1.76e-4 -2.85e-3 0.945 0.0581 0.810
[PH Win] (331) (1, 331)
Entries to Disp. 0.0254 0.0239 0.865 16.63 5.12e-5 *
[PH Loss] (638) (1, 638)
Entries to Disp. 1.27e-4 -2.89e-3 0.945 0.0421 0.838
[PH Win] (331) (1, 331)
Total Entries 0.0188 0.0173 0.848 12.74 5.00e-4 *
[PH Loss] (638) (1, 638)
Table 6: Time Trends by Prevailing Party
However, the fact that complexity of patent holder wins
does not exhibit a significant time trend does not necessarily
mean that the trend in patent holder losses reflects
disproportionately increasing burdens on accused infringers.
First, there are substantially fewer patent holder wins, which
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likely to register as significant when small differences are
involved. Furthermore, since patent holder wins are more
complex overall, the absence of a clear trend could indicate that
certain policy or other changes over time have selectively
reduced the complexity of patent holder wins. Particularly if
complexity has generally increased across all cases (e.g.,
corresponding with inflation), a selective complexity-reducing
impact due to policy changes could register as the absence of a
net time trend for patent holder wins. We test this hypothesis
in Part 2 below.
4. Effect of Policy Changes
In the final analyses, we investigate whether major
recent policy shifts have had significant effects on the
complexity of patent cases. To do so, we conduct difference-in-
difference (DID) regressions to determine whether the
complexity of a specific set of cases has changed relative to
another set of cases, controlling for all other factors. More
particularly, the DID specification tests whether there is a
significant difference before versus after a certain event (the
first "difference" in "difference-in-difference") between the
extent to which the complexity of two distinct sets of cases is
different from each other (the second "difference"). The event
in question is expected to impact only one set of cases, and
therefore the DID analysis is able to measure the extent of this
impact and support an inference that the event caused it.
The two different sets of cases at play are patent holder
wins and losses, respectively. The "event" in question is
actually a series of policy shifts occurring during the 2008+
(2008-2011) timeframe, which principally took place via several
Federal Circuit decisions regarding remedies for patent
infringement. To the extent these decisions affected case
complexity, we would expect to see a differential effect on
patent holder wins, which are subject to these new standards,
relative to patent holder losses, in which remedies are not
adjudicated. Accordingly, we seek to compare the difference in
complexity between patent holder wins and losses across two
timeframes-pre-2008 (2004-2007) and 2008+ (2008-2011).
In particular, the Federal Circuit's decisions in Lucent v.
Gateway,44 ResQNet v. Lansa,45 Cornell v. HP 46 and Uniloc v.
Microsoft,47 among other cases, heightened the standards for
proving lost profits and reasonable royalty damages from
44 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
45 ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
46 Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
41 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F. 3d 1292, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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infringement and therefore may have increased the complexity
of recovering remedies in cases where liability is established. 48
For example, in Lucent v. Gateway, the Federal Circuit vacated
a jury's reasonable royalty award of a lump-sum amount based
on several prior license agreements, requiring a more careful
analysis of the applicability of the licenses to the context at
hand and scrutinizing the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury's award. 49 In ResQNet, the Federal Circuit
again emphasized that proof of damages "requires sound
economic proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes
with infringement factored out of the economic picture." 50 In
Cornell, Federal Circuit Judge Rader, sitting by designation in
a New York District Court, required "credible economic
indicators" to prove lost profit damages, offering remittitur of
the jury's damages award based on the "entire market value
rule." 51 Finally, in Uniloc, the Federal Circuit rejected the
long-standing "25% Rule of Thumb," which was used to set a
baseline royalty rate as a starting point of damages
calculations. 52  Together, these cases arguably represent a
heightening of the burdens of proving patent infringement
damages, potentially increasing the litigation effort required to
recover. Accordingly, cases that awarded damages following
these decisions should exhibit increased complexity, and that
complexity should be specifically situated in the remedies
phase. We test these hypotheses below.
We construct the DID model with certain Boolean flags
that identify (1) patent holder wins versus losses, (2) cases
decided pre-2008 and 2008+, and (3) patent holder wins
specifically in the 2008+ timeframe (an interaction variable of
the previous two flags). We are interested in the sign and
significance of the coefficient of the third variable-a
significant positive coefficient will mean that the complexity of
patent holder wins relative to losses (i.e., the overall complexity
of cases in which patent holders win relative to the complexity
of cases in which accused infringers win) has increased across
the two time periods, and a significant negative coefficient will
indicate a decrease.
Based on the results in preceding Part, we expect to see
a decrease in the complexity of wins relative to losses from pre-
2008 to 2008+, given that patent holder losses exhibit
48 See also IP Innovation LLC v. Red Hat Inc., No. 2:07-CV-447 (RRdR), 2010
WL 986620 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2010); WordTech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated
Network Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
49 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1329-30.
50 ResQNet, 594 F. 3d at 870 (quoting Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-
Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
51 Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
52 Uniloc, , 632 F. 3d at 1335.
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increasing complexity over time whereas patent holder wins
have no overall time trend. Table 7 shows this result, based on
a simple regression involving only flags (1)-(3) above:
Regressor Coeff. Std.Err. t-val Pr(> It I) Signif.
1) Patent Holder Win? 0.391 0.10 4.09 4.8e-5
2) Case Year 2008-2011? 0.234 0.07 3.15 1.7e-3 **







Table 7 -Difference-in-Difference Model (without Fixed
Effects)
We see from Table 7 that the coefficient on the
interaction term (3) is in fact negative, corresponding to the
relative decrease in the complexity of wins during this period,
but its magnitude is not statistically significant. 53 In absolute
terms, the difference in number of docket events decreased
from approx. 243 for wins vs. 164 for losses pre-2008 to approx.
252 for wins (a negligible increase) to 207 for losses (a
significant increase) in the years 2008 onwards.
In order to ascertain whether the different trends of
wins vs. losses is indeed attributable to the aforementioned
policy changes in the 2008+ period, we must control for other
factors that influence case complexity. Adding the time-
invariant case, party and patent characteristics (fixed effects)
from our final regression model above allows us to do this.
Table 8 shows the resulting regression coefficients of the
relevant Boolean flags in this model:
Vol. 18
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Regressor Coeff Std.Err. t-val Pr(> It I) Signif
1) Patent Holder Win? 0.0783 0.0870 0.900 0.368
2) Case Year 2008-2011? 0.109 0100 1.091 0.275
3) Patent Holder Win x 2008-2011? -0.307 0.101 -3.049 0.0024 **







Table 8 -Difference-in-Difference Model (with Fixed Effects)
Here, after controlling for other factors of the litigation
we see that patent holder wins (relative to losses) in the 2008+
time period are significantly less complex than pre-2008, all
else equal. We interpret this result as indicating that the
policy shifts regarding patent remedies have reduced the
complexity of patent holder wins. 54
5. Parsing the Difference
Finally, we investigate what phases of litigation
produced the change in relative complexity of patent holder
wins to losses that we observe above, using the phase
delineations defined in our earlier analysis. 55 Figure 14 below
shows the change in docket counts from pre-2008 to 2008+
cases across each phase of litigation, with patent holder wins in
the top row and patent holder losses in the bottom row:
54 It is possible to interpret this event another way, namely that patent holder
losses have increased as a result of policy shifts or other exogenous events
during the 2008-2011 timeframe. However, we are not aware of any such
events. Rather, given the comprehensive set of variables coded and absence
of other explanations, we think that the more likely explanation is that case
complexity overall has increased with time, but recent policy events have
simultaneously had a decreasing effect on the complexity of patent holder
wins.
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Figure 14: Changes in Complexity by










The results are striking. Regarding patent holder wins,
we observe an apparent increase in complexity of Phase II
(trial), as well as a decrease in the post-trial proceedings of
Phase III. 56 This suggests that the policy shift in remedies
case law starting around 2008 has made disputes over damages
and injunctions more contentious. That is, having controlled
for all other factors in the DID specification, we interpret the
escalation in Phase II complexity as increased litigation effort
regarding adjudication of remedies, namely damages and
injunctions. Also, the decrease in Phase III could indicate that
resulting remedies are less favorable to patent holders, giving
rise to fewer disputes involving motions for JNOV, remittitur
and other post-trial activity. Additionally, accused infringers
may be moving directly to appeal, thinking that the Federal
Circuit will reverse the District Court under the new remedies
jurisprudence.
Additionally, we find that the increase in complexity of
patent holder losses over time is driven principally by
increasing Phase I complexity. 57 This could reflect heightened
56 These differences are not statistically significant at the 5% level; however,
the sample sizes are quite small for each subset.
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complexity of discovery proceedings, perhaps corresponding to
proliferation of e-discovery and document retention practices.
However, this also likely reflects increased effort by defendants
to secure claim constructions that drive the final outcome in
their favor. 58
Finally, we report the net change in the complexity of
each phase across all cases (combining wins and losses). As
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Pre-2008 2008+ Pre-2008 2008+ Pre-2008 2008+
Figure 15: Changes in Complexity by Phase of Litigation (All
Cases Combined)
V. CONCLUSION
In this study we investigate patent case complexity
using five principal lines of inquiry. First, at the most basic
level we ask how complexity can be measured, so as to support
detailed statistical analysis. We find that docket activity yields
the most robust metrics for analysis. We construct three
metrics based on docket activities, reflecting the numbers of
docket entries to disposition and case closure, respectively, as
well as substantive motions by the parties and court orders.6 0
Second, we ask how complexity varies across different
types of cases. We find that patent holder wins are
significantly more complex than patent holder losses. This
added complexity corresponds to the remedies phase, which is
generally present only in patent holder wins. Notably,
individual party effort (in terms of number of motions filed)
58 Although there appears to be a slight increase in Phase II complexity of
patent holder losses, the change is not significant at the 5% level.
59 However, only the increase in Phase I complexity is significant at the 5%
level (p-Value = 0.0204), whereas the increase in the Phase II complexity is
significant only at the 15% level (p-Value = 0.1147). The observed decrease in
Phase III is not significant.
60 As expected, our fourth metric, total case duration, does not accurately reflect
case complexity.
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does not significantly differ between patent holder wins and
losses, which suggests that case outcome is not driven solely by
which party litigates harder.
Third, we investigate the complexity of the three
principal phases of patent litigation, as punctuated by the
Markman claim construction hearing and the dispositive
District Court order. We find that Phase II (trial or summary
judgment) is the most complex, followed closely by Phase I
(discovery and Markman). By contrast, Phase III (post-
disposition) is significantly less complex. Also, we compare the
respective phases between patent holder wins and losses, and
we find that Phase II in patent holder wins are significantly
more complex than in patent holder losses, reflecting remedies
determinations in patent holder wins and the possibility of
summary judgment dispositions in patent holder losses.
Fourth, we run regression analyses to identify the
principal factors associated with greater or lesser complexity in
each case. We are able to construct regression models with a
reasonable degree of fit with respect to each of the docket entry
metrics. Among the most notable results, party size has a
significant increasing effect on case complexity, for both patent
holders and accused infringers. Looking more closely at the
complexity of NPE litigation, we find that PAE cases are not
significantly more complex than other cases on average,
whereas cases involving individual plaintiffs tend to be
significantly less complex, possibly reflecting lower resources
and sophistication of individuals. Certain patent attributes are
also significant, including cases involving computer technology
(high tech) patents and cases in which multiple patents are at
issue.
Finally, we ask whether complexity has increased over
time, and we further analyze the impact of key policy shifts in
recent years. We find that complexity has increased over time
in the aggregate, which appears to be driven by an increase in
the complexity of discovery and Markman proceedings,
particularly in cases where accused infringers prevail. This
could reflect the advent of e-discovery proceedings;
alternatively, it could also suggest that accused infringers are
litigating more aggressively prior to claim construction.
Moreover, we find that key policy shifts by the Federal
Circuit and Supreme Court to reform their jurisprudence of
patent remedies have had a significant impact on the
complexity of patent holder wins. Overall, the complexity of
patent holder wins relative to losses has decreased from the
2004-2007 to 2008-2011 time periods, and the change is
statistically significant after controlling for other relevant
factors. By decomposing each set of cases into their litigation
phases we can further investigate where the changes in
complexity occurred, and we find that the complexity of trials
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in patent holder wins has generally increased, whereas the
complexity of post-trial proceedings in those cases has
decreased.
We conclude that the determination of patent
infringement remedies has become more contentious and
complex as a result of the Supreme Court's and Federal
Circuit's policy shifts. Cases such as Uniloc (invalidating the
"25% rule of thumb" for calculating reasonable royalties),6 1
Cornell v. HP (tightening the requirements to prove lost profits
damages),6 2  ResQNet (expanding evidentiary bases for
challenging reasonable royalties), 6 3 and Lucent v. Gateway
(interpreting various Georgia-Pacific factors for determining
reasonable royalty rates),6 4  have driven this trend.
Importantly, trials remain the sole venue for patent holders to
enforce and recover from infringement of their rights. To the
extent patent trials have become too complex, or excessively
skewed against patent holders, the value of patents and the
innovation capital they provide could be harmed.
Looking forward, this study opens a number of avenues
for future analysis. In particular, the dramatic recent changes
to the U.S. patent litigation system under the AIA are likely to
have significantly affected case complexity. Analyzing the
complexity of recent cases once sufficient data becomes
available, using the framework we develop herein, can provide
important insights into the effects of these changes and guide
policy measures in future.
61 Uniloc, 632 F. 3d at 1292, 1335.
62 Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
63 ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 860.
64 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1301.
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Our dataset comprises a vast set of over 1000 U.S.
District Court cases decided from 2004 to 2011, including
summary judgments, bench trials, and jury verdicts. We
exclude default judgments and other dismissals, as these are
not representative of the complexity of most proceedings, and
we also exclude cases primarily involving design patents, as
the standards for design patent construction and infringement
are considerably different than utility patents. 5
We start from a database of patent decisions maintained
by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). PwC uses this data in its
annual reports on patent litigation, which are widely cited and
used by academics, practitioners, and government policy-
makers.66  Working from the PwC dataset, we excluded
dismissals and design patent cases, as well as a certain small
proportion of cases where records were not accessible, yielding
a dataset of 984 cases during this period. The figures below
provide the breakdown of cases by year of decision, outcome
(patent holder wins versus losses) and type of disposition
(infringement versus invalidity versus non-infringement versus
unenforce ability).
Figure 16 below shows the number of cases by year of
decision contained in the underlying PwC dataset, and Figure
17 provides a breakdown of patent holder wins versus accused
infringer wins in each year.
65 Specifically, we excluded cases where all or the majority of patents at issue in
the case were design patents.
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Figure 17: Number of PH Wins vs. Al Wins per Year
Finally, Figure 18 provides the breakdown of
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Figure 18: Breakdown of Cases by Type of Disposition
42




Case, Party and Patent Characteristics:
For each case, we coded over 100 variables describing
characteristics of the cases and procedural posture, the
individual litigants, and the patents at issue. Below is a
summary of the principal variables we coded and details of our
research procedure. A full list of variables follows in Appendix
B-2.
* Case Variables: Our case variables include the
particular U.S. District Court that heard the case as
well as the Circuit in which such court was located.
We recorded procedural details about each litigation,
such as whether it was a declaratory judgment
action, whether the case was decided on summary
judgment or after a trial, and whether a bench or
jury trial was held.
We read the initial complaint to identify the types of
claims that were asserted. Where the case involved
other claims in addition to infringement, we coded
Boolean flags to denote the allegations, such as
breach of contract (e.g., in a patent licensing
dispute), trade secret misappropriation, or antirust
or patent misuse claims. We read the opinions to
determine whether these allegations were fully
litigated or dropped along the way. We identified
whether each case involved a claim of infringement
based on filing of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA).
We used the dockets and opinions to identify
whether a separate Markman hearing was
conducted to construe the claims, whether a party
moved for interlocutory appeal following the
Markman, and whether such motion was granted.
We recorded whether the Court granted a
preliminary injunction or permanent injunction. We
further identified venue transfers and stays where
this was apparent from the dockets, as well as filings
of appeal following the final judgment and other
post-determination filings such as motions for
vacatur or remittitur.
* Litigant Characteristics: We counted the number of
plaintiffs and defendants in each case and recorded
their names. We conducted research to determine
whether they are publicly traded and where it was
available, recorded their market capitalization and
principal industry SIC codes. We also included
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PwC's coding of whether the patent holder was a
non-practicing entity and the specific type: an
individual, university, or company (which includes
Patent Assertion Entities). We further coded the
number of law firms and attorneys of record
representing each party.
* Patent Attributes: Finally, we used the Thomson
Innovation patent databases to incorporate
attributes of the patents at issue.6 7 We recorded the
application date and issue date (from which we
computed the prosecution time and patent age at the
date of the complaint), as well as the earliest priority
date of each patent. We recorded the primary IPC
code, whether the patent was a design or utility
patent, and whether the patent had a PCT number
representing an international filing. We coded the
number of inventors, number of backward citations
(broken down by patent and non-patent literature)
and forward citations.6 8  We also obtained the
number of related patents and applications in the
family tree of each asserted patent. We created
Boolean flags indicating whether the patent had
been reexamined, reissued or corrected (via a
certificate of correction). Finally, we recorded the
total number of claims and further auto-parsed the
claim language to identify the total number of
independent versus dependent claims.
* Pre-Processing Methodology: Certain of the raw
data was converted into Boolean flags or grouped
into categorical variables to avoid small bucket sizes
or highly-skewed data. For example, patent IPC
codes were categorized into 8 groupings based on the
first letter industry marker, and SIC codes were
67 Note that by "patents at issue" we are referring to the patents asserted in the
original complaint. We also recorded the patents involved in the final
dispositions, which in most cases were the same patents originally asserted.
Even where some patents were dismissed or invalidated along the way, the
process of doing so presumably may have contributed to the litigation
duration and number of docket entries, and therefore we considered the
patents asserted to be the most appropriate set for analyzing patent
attributes.
68 Given the age of the patents in these cases at the time of coding, we did not
age-adjust forward citations (e.g., using the NBER adjustment factors based
on Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg's methodology). Rather, we used the current
forward citation count as the estimate of lifetime citations, on the basis that
most of these patents should have already received the vast majority of their
citations. The average age at the time asserted is five years, and given case
durations and the decision years in our dataset, nearly all patents are at
least ten years old as of our coding.
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grouped into 10 categories based on NAICS
classification ranges according to the first two digits
thereof. We also coded a Boolean flag to represent
whether a single or multiple patent holder was
named in the case and whether the patent holder(s)
were represented by multiple law firms. We
converted the total number of recorded assignments
into a Boolean flag indicating whether or not the
asserted patent had been assigned.
In cases where multiple patents were at issue, we
combined relevant attributes by computing averages
and minimum/maximum values. For example, if a
case involved three patents, patent A issued in 2001
and 1.2 years of age at the time of the complaint,
patent B issued in 2002 and 2.5 years of age at the
time of the complaint, and patent C issued in 2003
and 3.3 years of age at the time of the complaint, we
used the average age of 2.3 years and minimum and
maximum issue years of 2001 and 2003,
respectively. If a patent in IPC A (Human
Necessities) and a patent in IPC C (Chemistry) was
asserted in the same case, we coded both flags as
true. Similarly, if any of the asserted patents had
been reexamined or corrected we coded the
aggregate case flags as true.6 9
For forward citations and backward citations, we
calculated the averages of each of these
quantitiesand recorded the maximum for all patents
at issue in the case. We did not use the aggregate
total of these fields to avoid double-counting-for
example, for cases involving multiple patents by the
same applicant, we expect some overlap in the
citations made to previous patents as well as an
increased likelihood in overlap in the forward
citations received by each. Conversely, we recorded
the average number of claims as well as the
aggregate total number of claims across all patents
asserted, as infringement and invalidity are claim-
specific analyses and patent prosecution
requirements impose limits on covering the same
subject matter in multiple claims. Therefore, we
69 In instances where multiple patents were at issue but one or more of them
were missing certain fields in the Thomson Innovation databases, we
computed the averages using the available data and reduced the averaging
denominator to avoid reduction in the resulting quantity. For example, if the
filing date of one of three patents was not available, we calculated the
prosecution time (filing to issue) of the remaining two patents and used the
average of these two times.
2016
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would expect each claim to be distinct, and each
could potentially contribute to the overall complexity
of the case.
* We also conducted testing to avoid cross-correlations
and multi-collinearity in the data. Where two
variables were strongly correlated we selected only
one for the regression models, and where a set of
variables exhibited multi-colline arity we dropped
one or more.70 We further constructed the final
regression models via an iterative process, starting
with a small number of unique variables and
gradually adding additional independent variables
and checking for significant changes in the resulting
fit and degrees of freedom.7 1
* Finally, we log-transformed (natural logarithm) each
of our complexity metrics to facilitate significance
testing and regression analysis.
70 For example, the minimum application year of the asserted patents was
significantly negatively correlated with average patent age, and the resulting
regression models contained significant oppositely-signed correlations for
both variables. We excluded minimum application year from the to remove
this effect and found that average patent age was not significant at the 5
percent level in the resulting model.
71 Multiple iterative ANOVA tests were conducted to check for significant
changes between the different models.
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Unique case identifier (use this number at start of
each associated filename).
Name of captioned plaintiff.
Name of captioned defendant.
CV case number.
District court for this docket. (NOTE: Ask me if there
was a venue transfer).
Date of initial complaint.
Year of decision.




Names of each plaintiff (separated by a semicolon).
Names of each defendant (separated by a semicolon).
True if action against patent-holder for declaratory
judgment of non-infringement.
True if case decided by a jury; False for bench trial.
True if case resulted in a trial.
Date of the trial (if any).
True if patent-holder won (at least one patent held
valid and infringed). NOTE: Will be False if plaintiff
won in a DJ action seeking a declaration of non-
infringement.
True if pleadings also asserted a breach of contract
claim.
True if pleadings also asserted a misappropriation
claim.
True if pleadings also asserted an antitrust claim.
True if pleadings also asserted another claim (not
listed above).
True if final opinion also adjudicated a breach of
contract claim.
True if final opinion also adjudicated a
misappropriation claim.
True if final opinion also adjudicated an antitrust
claim.
True if final opinion also adjudicated another claim
(not listed above).
True if District Court issued a written opinion.
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True if case concluded by dismissal.
True if infringement allegation is based on an ANDA
filing.
True if case included a design patent.
True if a permanent injunction was issued.
True if a preliminary injunction or TRO was issued.
True if any patent was held invalid.
True if any patent was held unenforceable.
Patent numbers asserted.
Patent numbers held to be valid (separated by
semicolons).
Patent numbers held to be invalid (separated by
semicolons).
Patent numbers held to be enforceable (separated by
semicolons).
Patent numbers held to be unenforceable (separated
by semicolons).
Patent numbers held infringed (separated by
semicolons).
Patent numbers held non-infringed (separated by
semicolons).
Defendants (or Plaintiffs in a DJ action) who were
involved in the final opinion/order. (Names separated
by semicolons.)
Number of docket events from the complaint to the
final decision (including remittitur/vacatur but not
including subsequent appeal).
Total number of docket events.
Number of law firms representing plaintiffs.
Number of law firms representing defendants.
Names of law firms representing plaintiffs (separated
by semicolons).
Names of law firms representing defendants
(separated by semicolons).
Number of named attorneys representing plaintiffs.
Number of named attorneys representing defendants.
Number of *total filings* filed by plaintiff(s)
(excluding appeal).
Number of motions filed by plaintiff(s) (excluding
appeal).
Number of *total filings* filed by defendant(s)
(excluding appeal).
Number of motions filed by defendant(s) (excluding
appeal).
Number of *total filings* filed by court (excluding
appeal).





































































True if there was a Markman hearing for claim
construction.
True if a party FILED for interlocutory appeal after
the Markman.
True if the court GRANTED motion for interlocutory
appeal after the Markman. (NOTE: Ask me if there
was an interlocutory appeal at another point in the
case.)
Number of *total filings* filed by plaintiff(s) pre-
Markman (if applicable).
Number of motions filed by plaintiff(s) pre-Markman
(if applicable).
Number of *total filings* filed by defendant(s) pre-
Markman (if applicable).
Number of motions filed by defendant(s) pre-
Markman (if applicable).
Number of *total filings* filed by court pre-Markman
(if applicable).
Number of memoranda/opinions/orders by the court
pre-Markman (if applicable).
True if there was a venue transfer (include details in
Notes).
True if the litigation was stayed at any point (include
details in Notes).
Number of amici briefs filed with the court (if any).
True if party FILED for remittitur or vacatur post-
decision.
True if the court GRANTED motion for remittitur or
vacatur post-decision.
True if a party FILED for appeal.
True if Plaintiff is a public company.
Plaintiffs market capitalization / private valuation.
4-digit SIC code of Plaintiff.
True if Plaintiff is a non-practicing entity.
True if Defendant is a public company.
Defendant's market capitalization / private valuation.
Application date of the patent.
Earliest priority date of the patent.
Does the patent claim priority from an earlier
application? (T/F)
Issue date of the patent.
Duration between application and issue.
Duration between issue and complaint.
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IPC Codes of the patent.
US Classification Codes of the patent.
Does the patent name an original assignee? (T/F)
Has the patent been assigned (based on USPTO
records)? (T/F)
Number of named inventors of the patent.
Number of backward citations to patent references.
Number of backward citations to non-patent
references.
Number of forward citations.
Size of the patent family of which this patent is a
member.
Was the patent reissued?
Was the patent reexamined?
Was the patent corrected?
Total number of claims.






















* # Accused Infringers
S#AT Firms
* Large-Entity AT?
* Multiple Patent Holders?















* Avg. FC 0.00
* Avg. Age 0.00
* Max. Family Size 0.01
* Multiple Patents? 0.08
* IPC A? -0.10
* IPC B? -0.01
* IPC G or H? -0.06
* High-Tech? 0.14


















Regression Results-Docket Entries to Disposition:
Regressor Coeff. Std.Err.
Case, Disposition and Procedure Variables
* Year of Disposition 0.04 0.01
* 1s Circuit 0.16 0.23
* 3rd Circuit 0.55 0.21
* 5th Circuit 0.22 0.21
* 7th Circuit 0.50 0.22
* 9th Circuit 0.50 0.21
* ANDA? -0.11 0.11
* Invalid Patent? -0.01 0.06
* Unenforceable Patent? -0.08 0.09
* Non-Infringed Patent? -0.13 0.06
* Venue Transfer? 0.01 0.12
* Stay? 0.20 0.05
* Markman? 0.34 0.05
* Interloc. Appeal? 0.43 0.10
* Jury Trial? 0.61 0.07
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Regression Results-Total Docket Entries:
Regressor Coeff. Std.Err. t-val Pr(> I t 1) Signif.
Case, Disposition and Procedure Variables
* Year of Disposition 0.03
* 1s Circuit 0.29
* 3rd Circuit 0.61
* 5th Circuit 0.25
* 7th Circuit 0.56
* 9th Circuit 0.55
* ANDA? -0.11
* Invalid Patent? 0.06
* Unenforceable Patent? -0.08
* Non-Infringed Patent? -0.07
* Venue Transfer? -0.01
* Stay? 0.22
* Markman? 0.34
* Interloc. Appeal? 0.37
* Jury Trial? 0.62
* Bench Trial? 0.12
Litigant Variables
* # Accused Infringers
S#AT Firms
* Large-Entity AT?
* Multiple Patent Holders?















* Avg. FC 0.00
* Avg. Age 0.00
* Max. Family Size 0.01
* Multiple Patents? 0.05
* IPC A? -0.09
* IPC B? -0.02
* IPC G or H? -0.07
* High-Tech? 0.14

















































































































Ashtor: OPENING PANDORA'S Box: ANALYZING THE COMPLEXITY OF U.S. PATENT LI
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
270 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Distribution of Residuals
I I I I I I I
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2












S , I I I I I I I
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Theoretical Quantiles














Regression Results-Substantive Docket Entries to Disposition:
Regressor Coeff
Case, Disposition and Procedure Variables
* Year of Disposition 0.01
* 1st Circuit -0.07
* 3rd Circuit 0.09
* 5th Circuit 0.21
* 7th Circuit 0.14
* 9th Circuit 0.09
* ANDA? -0.13
* Invalid Patent? 0.09
* Unenforceable Patent? 0.15
* Non-Infringed Patent? -0.03
* Venue Transfer? -0.03
* Stay? 0.23
* Markman? 0.40
* Interloc. Appeal? 0.42
* Jury Trial? 0.39
* Bench Trial? 0.20
Litigant Variables
* # Accused Infringers
S#AT Firms
* Large-Entity AT?
* Multiple Patent Holders?















* Avg. FC 0.00
* Avg. Age 0.00
* Max. Family Size 0.00
* Multiple Patents? 0.04
* IPC A? -0.04
* IPC B? 0.08
* IPC G or H? -0.07
* High-Tech? 0.09
Full regression results on file with the author.
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Regression Results-Duration to Disposition:
Regressor Coeff. Std.Err. t-val Pr(> I t 1) Signif.
Case, Disposition and Procedure Variables
* Year of Disposition 0.01
I 1s Circuit 0.05
* 3rd Circuit 0.05
* 5th Circuit -0.17
* 7th Circuit -0.10
* 9th Circuit -0.15
* ANDA? -0.06
* Invalid Patent? 0.06
* Unenforceable Patent? -0.09
* Non-Infringed Patent? 0.09
* Venue Transfer? 0.19
* Stay? 0.21
* Markman? 0.14
* Interloc. Appeal? 0.26
* Jury Trial? -0.01
* Bench Trial? 0.03
Litigant Variables
* # Accused Infringers
S#AT Firms
* Large-Entity AT?
* Multiple Patent Holders?















* Avg. FC 0.00
* Avg. Age 0.00
* Max. Family Size 0.00
* Multiple Patents? -0.01
* IPC A? 0.04
* IPC B? 0.13
* IPC G or H? -0.01
* High-Tech? -0.04
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